What the current Argentinian Football mess may teach countries

October 18, 2009

Simon Kuper has a provocative take on Argentina’s current football mess in FT.

The key is that there are two views of what a national football team is for. The first is the professional view: the team exists to win matches. To do that, it needs to follow best international practice. However, Argentina chose Maradona because it had embraced the second – nationalist – view: the team must be the nation made flesh. Silly as Argentina now looks, many countries periodically fall into the same trap.

This is true not just of football teams but frequently of countries where they believe that there is some unique way of doing business. Whether it’s the Asian way or the Indian way so even the Scandinavian way. Business, trade and culture could be segregated in past days because it took time for innovations and ideas to spread, but in today’s day and age there is only one way and that is the global way.


Going back to First Principles

March 17, 2009

A fantastic article by FT’s Willem Buiter on gambling vs. insurance

For the insurance industry, the insurance vs gambling distinction was operationalised using the concept of insurable interest.

He goes on to lay out, why insuring things which one does not own, leads to negative externalities

The traditional Islamic opposition to trading risk without there being an insurable risk – to gambling, that is – extends well beyond the financial sphere.  Indeed, in much of traditional Judaism and Christianity as well, gambling and betting are viewed as signs of moral weakness – as sins.  But these moral, ethical and medical (gambling as an addiction) arguments are quite separate from the argument I have explored in this post, that risk trading without an insurable interest may be economically inefficient and destructive, not (just) for familiar moral hazard or micro-endogenous risk reasons but for macro-endogenous risk reasons.

Worth the 15 mins it would take to read and understand it!

Mark-to-Market Accounting and Investors Due Diligence

February 11, 2009

There is a rant in today’s FT by Willem Buiter on Barclay’s Annual Results reported in FT and he picks up a specific quote

“The bank confirmed it had written down its exposures to complex debt instruments by £8bn in 2008, though the impact was reduced by a £1.66bn gain it booked from the reduced value of its own debt.”

He writes

With very few exceptions, banks now use every means at their disposal to hide financial embarrassments on of off the balance sheet for as long as possible.  Rigorous mark-to-market valuation without managerial discretion as to whether to shift assets from one valuation bucket to another is a partial solution.  Unfortunately, the IASB lost first its nerve and then the plot in response to pressure from those exposed to toxic and dodgy assets.  Banks can now drive a coach and horses through fair value principles and release what information they want when they want it.

This approach seems to be a classic case of shooting the messenger. MTM is not to blame for the losses the shareholders are making. The gains being counted are perfectly legitimate for accounting and tax regulatory reasons.

The Annual Report clearly states that there is a gain of 1.66 billion from reduced value of own debt. They have not tried to hide it. All businesses have areas where a gain or loss happens not because of business operations but rather because of a change in external environment. Like Airlines losing due to sudden spike in Oil prices, Indian Exporters gaining from weakening of the Rupee Vs. the dollar.

The responsibility of the business and the auditor is to clearly highlight that there have been extraordinary gains or losses made from events outside the normal scope of business operations.

Of course in case of FI whose profits are primarily based on proprietary trading sorting out ordinary from extra-ordinary events becomes difficult, but again it’s the responsibility of the investor to appropriately discount the profits. Instead of having a P/E ratio of 30 he may decide to forgo investing in such risky investments.

As they say caveat emptor!